Bagwell commitment and observability in games

Documents: Advanced Search Include Citations. Authors: Advanced Search Include Citations. Citations: 1 - 0 self. These results suggest that Bagwell 's result is driven by his exclusive consideration of a p Documents: Advanced Search Include Citations. Authors: Advanced Search Include Citations.

Citations: 5 - 0 self. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Correspondence to Roberto A. Reprints and Permissions. Experimental Economics 7, 25—48 Download citation. Issue Date : February Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:.

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article. Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative. Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search. Abstract Previous studies have shown that simply knowing one player moves first can affect behavior in games, even when the first-mover's moves are known to be unobservable.

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